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This study analyses the process of ethnic mobilization in the Soviet and post-
Soviet eras and assesses the way in which history, memory and the treatment of 
the Volga Tatars by the Soviet state, especially under Lenin and Stalin, affected 
their long term desire for greater independence from Moscow. The central 
argument of this study is that Volga Tatar’s nation building was influenced by 
changes introduced under Gorbachev and by the weaknesses of the post-Soviet 
state particularly during the Yeltsin era of the 1990s. The article assesses the 
strategies the President of Tatarstan and his advisors utilized during this period, 
especially after 1985, to successfully negotiate a bilateral treaty with Moscow 
in February 1994 granting Tatarstan greater autonomy and independence. 
Within this framework, the article then provides a detailed analysis of the 
approach taken in Tatarstan to achieve this goal and to renew the treaty in 
October 2005, despite Putin’s recentralization policies from 2000-2008.  
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This article analyses the process of ethnic mobilization in one of the republics of the 
Russian Federation—Tatarstan. It is one of the four Turkish republics of Russia, the 
home of the Volga Tatars, and a well developed industrial part of the former Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) with significant natural resources, especially oil. 
This republic has a population of around 4 million. By 2002, Tatars made up the 
majority with 52.9%, followed by Russians at 39.9%, Chuvash at 3.3% and other 
nationalities at 3.9% (Itogi, 2002; Natsional’nyi sostav, 2004: 156-157). Tatars are 
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dispersed throughout the Russian Federation and this article only refers to Volga 
Tatars. 
The following analysis takes a historical approach, and critically assesses the 
Volga Tatars’ attempts at national revival in the Soviet and post-Soviet eras. It draws 
upon Tatar, Russian and Western historiography and corresponding literature. The 
overall goal is to critically assess, first, the process of ethnic mobilization in Tatarstan 
over the last two decades in a broader long-term perspective; second, the changing 
strategy used by the Tatar leadership and elite to achieve greater ‘sovereignty’ from 
Moscow in the period from Mikhail Gorbachev to Vladimir Putin; third, the influence 
of various factors and strategies on the Tatar drive for autonomy; and fourth, the 
impact which all this has had on Tatar regional identity on the one hand, and centre–
periphery relations on the other, since 1991.   
The article uses some of the results of a project funded by the International 
Association formed by the European Union to promote East-West Scientific 
Cooperation (INTAS) on “Linguistic and Ethnic Revival in Russia: From Policy to 
Cultural Diversity”, implemented between 2006 and 2008, to argue that there are a 
number of reasons for the relative success of the Volga Tatars with regard to ethnic 
mobilization and nation building in Tatarstan. The first of these was their ability to 
overcome the ‘Soviet legacy’. The second was the key stabilizing factor of Mintimer 
Shaimiev, who offered the Tatars continuity and stability during a time of crisis 
(1991-1999) and also possessed other essential skills—notably  the ability to balance 
different competing interests and to use the appropriate rhetoric and discourse for both 
his Tatar and Russian supporters and opponents. The third reason was identified as the 
shift in Russian presidential power from weakness (under Boris Yeltsin) to strength 
(under Putin), as well as the related issue of decentralization versus recentralization 
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during the same period (1991-2008) and its potential impact on ethnic mobilization 
and nation building, especially in relation to the 1994 peace-sharing treaty and its 
subsequent renewal in 2005. Fourth was the vital issue of gains and losses: what did 
the different sides get out of the process and who can be said to have won or lost—the 
Tatars or the Russians? Once we have explored all these issues we will address one 
final question: what lessons can other parts of the Russian Federation, who want to 
achieve similar goals, learn from Tatarstan? What can Tatarstan teach historians of 
the post-Soviet space about the process of ethnic mobilization, nation building and 
ethnic conflict over the last 20 years and, more importantly, about the issue of conflict 
resolution and different ways of handling regional separatism, sovereignty, 
independence and secession, and building community cohesion in contemporary 
Russia at a time of constant change and rising nationalism and terrorism? We will 
discuss all of these issues from a historical perspective, taking into account the ‘Soviet 
legacy’, notably under Vladimir Lenin and Joseph Stalin, and the difficulties 
encountered in the post-Soviet era.  
 
The legacy of Soviet–Volga Tatar relations 
 
It is beyond the scope of this article to provide a detailed history of the Volga Tatars 
(see Rorlich, 1986) but a number of long-term factors have encouraged the drive for 
nationhood and the national revival among contemporary Volga Tatars. These include 
Tatars’ conversion to Islam, the destruction of the Kazan Khanate at the hands of Ivan 
the Terrible in 1552 and the forced Christianization that followed (Abdullin, 1976; 
Amirkhanov, 1998: 67-81; Diuduanbon et al., 1997; Khudayakov, 1991; Iskhavov, 
1999: 21-24; Musina 1998; Yemelianova 1999: 605-630).  
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Some attempt was made by Catherine the Great after 1773 to put an end to the 
rift between Russians and Tatars by ending religious persecution and giving Tatar 
nobles the same rights as their Russian counterparts1 but despite these concessions 
Volga Tatars never regained their full independence. Soviet historiography interpreted 
the destruction of an independent Kazan Khanate as a positive feature which enabled, 
in Gimadi’s opinion, “the Tatar people to enter into the composition of the Russian 
state and tie themselves directly to the Great Russian people” and thus choose the 
“correct historical path” (Gimadi, 1955: 5). This meant that Tatars were able to reap 
the benefits of Russia’s socioeconomic, political, military and cultural development. 
Volga Tatars naturally saw Russia’s actions as a form of conquest (Pelenski, 1974). 
Consequently, from the mid-sixteenth century to the present, the Volga Tatars have 
lived within the confines of the Russian state. Catherine’s legacy and subsequent 
Tsarist policy meant, in Yemelianova’s view, that “the bulk of the (Volga) Tatars did 
not perceive themselves outside Russia and saw their problems in all Russian 
democratic reform” (Yemelianova, 1999: 473). As a result, Tatar language, culture 
and elites still existed at the beginning of the twentieth century. However, by 1917 
some Tatars wanted autonomy whereas the Bolsheviks had opted for a national 
territorial solution. This led to the pre-revolutionary (1917) Tatar leaders being 
replaced by a new radical leadership (including S. Galiev, A. Kamaletdinov, I. Kuleev 
and S. Akmadiev) who were now in a position to take full advantage of Lenin’s policy 
of self-determination. 
 After the 1917 October Revolution, Lenin was in favour of the equality of all 
languages, as a means of undermining the class basis of nationalism, and he attempted 
to preserve and foster the culture of different nationalities via literacy campaigns, the 
promotion of traditional costumes and cultures, and the elevation of national elites 
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into the party, government, different sectors of the economy and the education system 
(Davletshin, 2005: section II). This move was made to legitimize Soviet power with 
the non-Russian peoples. Lenin preferred not to use Russian external pressure, which 
had led to the repression of ethnic minorities in the tsarist era (Martin, 2001), but to 
encourage the development of the Tatar language, culture and elites.  
On 20 May 1920, the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) 
was created and most Tatars were already literate at this point. After the civil war 
(1918-1920) and the introduction of the New Economic Policy (NEP) (1921-1927), a 
policy which Terry Martin refers to as “affirmative action” was pursued by the Soviet 
government (Martin, 2001: 13). This ‘Tatarization’ strategy involved the Tatar 
language being given official status in 1921 and it also enhanced the position of Volga 
Tatars, via their promotion into leading positions in the Tatar ASSR party, state and 
government structures (vydvizhenie). This korenizatsiia (‘nativization’ or 
‘indigenization’) policy led to the Tatar ASSR being governed in part by Tatar elites 
using their own national language. This affirmative action policy led to the rise of 
Tatar intellectual elites and Tatar language national schools under the jurisdiction of 
Narkompros.  
As a result, according to Burbiel, by 1930 more than 96% of all Tatar children 
were educated in their own language (Burbiel, 1975: 406). It is important to 
remember that President Shaimiev’s parents had lived through this crucial period 
when the issue of non-Russian self-determination was actively pursued. Kreindler 
points out that this ‘affirmative action’ policy assumed it was the Russians who were 
supposed to be bilingual in a non-Russian (in this case Tatar) area (Kreindler, 1979: 
7).  
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However, from the late 1920s onwards, after Lenin’s death, the reverse 
happened as the process of ‘Russification’ began under Stalin. In 1927 the Arabic 
script long used for Tatar was replaced by a Latin-based alphabet, despite strong 
opposition. As the political situation and atmosphere changed from 1928 onwards, 
some Volga Tatars, such as Mirza Sultan-Galiev, were accused of “anti-Soviet 
activity”. From 1921 to1924 Sultan-Galiev had tried to develop Muslim national 
communism and was frequently arrested, the second time in 1929 (Bennigsen-
Broxup, 1990: 281; Davletshin, 2005: 235). 
There was also a clampdown on key Tatar institutions, such as the Society for 
Tatar Studies and the Pedagogical Institute of Eastern and Tatar Schools, as these 
were viewed as centres of nationalism and part of the so-called ‘Sultan-Galiev 
movement’. Many Volga Tatars were subsequently arrested; 2,056 Tatar ASSR party 
members in 1930 alone (Davletshin, 2005: 236). According to Bennigsen-Broxup, 
after Lenin’s death the Tatar ASSR Communist Party had effectively split into two 
factions: one wing was still very much in favour of Sultan-Galiev’s approach while 
the other was more pro-Moscow. Attempts to reverse the domination of the latter 
between 1926 and 1928 failed, and Stalin launched the Great Terror on Sultan-
Galiev’s ‘rightist’ allies from the mid- to late 1930s (Benningsen-Broxup, 1990: 281-
282). This heavy-handed policy hindered the development of the Tatar indigenous 
intelligentsia, Tatar language, literature, culture and society for the rest of the Stalin 
era. As Burbiel notes, “[i]n the process Tatars lost almost all political leaders and only 
a handful of writers survived the disaster” (Burbiel, 1975: 396). 
This had consequences for Tatar identity and language. By 1932 native 
languages were taught from the first grade and a second language, usually Russian, 
from the third grade (Kreindler, 1979: 24). Throughout the 1930s the push for 
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Russification continued, mass radio was developed, and then finally in March 1938 a 
Soviet government decree made Russian compulsory in all schools of the USSR, 
including the Tatar ASSR. This change was made because of a widespread fear that 
the Russian language had been weakened and literacy levels were now allegedly 
below that of the tsarist era. However in reality there was still a Stalinist desire to 
clamp down on nationalists and alleged Sultan-Galievites in the Tatar ASSR 
(Grenoble, 2003: 195). This new law, which was implemented in September 1938, 
meant that by the end of the Stalin era “new generations of non-Russians became 
bilingual, mixing and matching their native and adopted Russian tongues at will, 
depending on the moment and desired meaning” (Smith, 1998: 166). 
Following the Soviet victory in the Great Patriotic War, the Tatar ASSR, 
which was a major industrial centre, underwent further intensive industrialization, 
urbanization and heavy Russian immigration. Furthermore, Nikita Khrushchev’s 1958 
Educational Reform completed the reversal of Leninist ‘affirmative action’ language 
and ethnic policies. Although each language was still theoretically equal, Khrushchev 
gave parents the choice on whether or not to send their children to Russian language 
schools (Blitstein, 2001: 254). This policy meant that Russian language was now the 
medium of instruction in many urban Volga Tatar schools (though Tatar remained 
strong in the countryside). From 1958 onwards, there was a decline in national 
languages and an expansion in Russian teaching in the cities. The number of hours 
devoted to Russian increased and it was introduced into the curriculum from the first 
grade; Russian was also taught in all pre-schools (Smith, 1998: 177). Tatar was now 
mainly offered in primary and secondary schools. As a consequence, by 1966 two 
thirds of Tatar children attended Russian schools in the Tatar ASSR. Although these 
Russian schools were supposed to provide two hours of Tatar language classes per 
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week from the second to the eighth grades, this policy was not always observed 
(Burbiel, 1975: 408-409). This policy meant less Tatar language availability and 
increasing bilingualism among non-Russians in the Tatar ASSR. Thus in the period 
1970-1989 over two thirds of Tatars (70.8%) declared that they were able to speak 
Russian (Bennigsen-Broxup 1990: 368). Furthermore higher education instruction in 
the Tatar ASSR was also delivered in the Russian language. 
However on the positive side, under Khrushchev’s thaw, many Tatars were 
rehabilitated. In fact throughout the post-Soviet era, the Volga Tatar intelligentsia 
proved to be remarkably resilient and, drawing upon a rich cultural heritage, they 
gradually recovered from the adverse impact of the Stalinist period. Although Volga 
Tatars aspired to increase their status by moving from an autonomous republic to a 
union republic, and tried on several occasions to achieve this goal, Leonid Brezhnev’s 
policies prevented Volga Tatars from achieving this aim. As a result this desire for 
autonomy never actually went away and from the late Gorbachev era onwards, a 
series of circumstances and factors put the issue back on the agenda. 
Some scholars emphasize that there is a strong inter-relationship between 
ethnic revival and the push for sovereignty in the late or post-communist era. Roeder 
and Treisman, for instance, argue that the long-term goal is nation building but on this 
road to sovereignty, the short-term aim is the political survival of post-Soviet elites, 
financial autonomy or greater independence from the centre (Moscow), and a desire 
to gain greater economic and political control over their own republican affairs (see 
Roeder, 1991: 196-232; Roeder, 1994; Treisman, 1997: 212-249). During this period 
between 1990 and 1991 there were a “parade of sovereignties”2 but we shall only 
evaluate how successful Tatarstan has been in pursuit of this goal. 
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Continuity and stability: the moderate Shaimiev factor3 
 
He (Shaimiev) combines in his disposition, resilience and firm 
straightforwardness, candour, dryness and emotionality, single heartiness and 
cunning even shrewdness, firmness of stance and softness in his attitude to 
people. As far as his character goes, he is not a revolutionary, but rather a 
rational conservative (Mustafin and Khasanov, 1995: 75, author’s emphasis). 
 
Even allowing for obvious bias, it is nevertheless commonly accepted that one of the 
most significant developments in Tatarstan’s favour before and after 1991 was the 
leadership of Mintimer Shaimiev, who was a dominant force in the republic, 
particularly during the Gorbachev, Yeltsin and Putin eras. There is no denying that 
Shaimiev’s calmness, caution, common sense, resolve and above all his moderate 
conservatism, were useful skills in managing the post-Soviet space and vital in 
negotiating the economic, political and social transition from 1991. He emphasized 
consent, stability and unity as key factors during Tatarstan’s drive for self-rule. He 
was an experienced Soviet era politician who understood the nature of Soviet and 
post-Soviet politics. This was due to the fact that he had climbed up the Soviet 
political ladder during the Brezhnev era of stagnation to become a member of the 
Soviet nomenklatura in the Tatar ASSR. Shaimiev was fully aware of the different 
degrees of power held by Gorbachev, Yeltsin and Putin as well as the delicate balance 
of power between the centre and periphery, so he knew just how far to go and when. 
More importantly he was also well acquainted with Tatar history, language and 
culture, the demands of Volga Tatars and the concerns of Russians, both locally and 
in the federal centre, Moscow.  
Shaimiev was born in the early Stalinist era (1937) and trained as a technocrat 
(he was awarded an engineering degree in 1959). Shaimiev became the Tatar ASSR’s 
Minister of Water Management in 1969, and was then made Deputy Premier of the 
Tatar ASSR in 1983, and served as Premier from 1985 to 1989. Between 1989 and 
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1990, Shaimiev became the First Secretary of the Tatar ASSR Communist Party, then 
Chairman of the parliament of Tatarstan from 1990 to 1991, before finally reaching 
the highest post of all, that of President of Tatarstan, which he held between 1991 and 
March 2010 (Mustafin and Khasanov, 1995: 12, 22). He was well aware of the 
importance of Tatar language, which he learnt at home and in school, and of the 
history of Tatar nation building.4  Thus Shaimiev declared at the First World Congress 
of Tatars in 1992: 
The history of the Tatars nation is very difficult and tragic. The Tatars lost their 
Bulgar state, but found a respectable place for themselves within the Golden 
Horde. After its collapse they created the khanates of Kazan [...] the restoration 
of statehood was an idea ever present in Tatar history (cited in Mustafin and 
Khasanov, 1995: 113). 
 
But Shaimiev also realized that he needed Russian to survive so he became a 
bilingual speaker. He was thus able to serve the Soviet system from the Brezhnev to 
Gorbachev eras and was also aware of the flaws in the Soviet system.  
During the Gorbachev period (1985-1991), there was renewed ethnic 
agitation, as the USSR was facing economic crisis, nationalism and growing 
separatism.5 During this period there was a push to increase the Tatar ASSR’s status 
to that of a Union Republic, a goal Volga Tatars had wanted since 1920. 
 As some scholars have pointed out the Tatar public centre (Tatarskii 
obshchestvennyi Tsentr or ‘ToTs’), created in June 1988, was at the forefront of this 
ethnic mobilization.6  The ToTs included famous Tatar writers, academics, clergy and 
other key members of Tatar cultural societies and clubs. These figures and groups had 
high expectations after over 60 years of waiting for Tatar nationhood and 
independence. Although relations were initially harmonious between the ToTs and the 
republican authorities, things started to deteriorate in January 1989, as the ToTs had 
tried too hard to build links beyond the Tatar ASSR, and demanded union republic 
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status and economic sovereignty, all of which caused tension with Moscow and the 
Tatar branch of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) (Kondrashov, 
2000: 119). According to Kondrashov: 
The [Tatar ASSR] authorities stood for tackling problems in agreement and 
consultation with all parties involved, in order not to upset order and stability, 
not to damage relations with neighbours and with Moscow (Kondrashov, 2000: 
119). 
 
In relation to the above quote, the key phrases are “in agreement”, 
“consultation”, and “all parties”, local and federal, and this emphasis and strategy 
distinguished the republican authorities from the more extreme nationalists in the 
ToTs. In Moscow’s view, some figures within the ToTs favoured Tatars over others, 
particularly Russians, whilst ToTs leaders accused the republican authorities, 
including Shaimiev, of “cowardice and passivity” and bowing to pressure from 
Moscow (Kondrashov, 2000: 119).  
While in the late 1980s, this looked like a serious miscalculation on the part of 
the then Tatar authorities and Shaimiev himself, in the long run it proved to be a 
turning point. This more gradualist approach allowed Shaimiev and his allies to gain 
some control over the ethnic mobilization agenda, to reduce the hold the extreme 
nationalists seemed to have over the process and, above all, it eased Moscow’s 
anxieties. This proved that Tatarstan’s drive for independence would probably not 
generate ethnic conflict. In my opinion, President Shamiaev’s experience of the 
political game and his well-honed negotiating skills proved decisive in avoiding such 
a situation.  
This was, of course, not the end of the matter. The Tatar ASSR authorities did 
not just placate Moscow, they eventually mended fences with the ToTs. In January 
1989, a ToTs congress draft pushed for complete economic sovereignty, and for Tatar 
as the only official language of the republic. However the Tatar authorities refused to 
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bend to this pressure, and meanwhile started to negotiate with Moscow over the issue 
of “broad autonomy on economic matters” and “real bilingualism” before allowing 
the ToTs to officially register as a public organization on 17 July 1989 (Kondrashov, 
2000: 119). According to Bennigsen-Broxup, ToTs radicals wanted an upgrade from 
AR to UR; sovereignty; increased Tatar representation in state organs; consultation on 
future developments, such as further industrialization; stronger links between the 
Tatar ASSR and the Tatar diaspora within the USSR; the reinstatement of Tatar as a 
state language; and a shift from the Cyrillic to the Latin alphabet for Tatar 
(Bennigsen-Broxup, 1990: 283-286). While these demands are understandable given 
the past treatment of the Volga Tatars during the tsarist period, under Stalin and in the 
post-Stalin era until Gorbachev’s rise to power, fulfilling such demands would have 
probably engendered a negative, possibly military, reaction from Moscow; as a result 
the Tatar authorities championed some of these ToTs ideas, but in “a more moderate 
form” (Kondrashov, 2000: 122-127).  Thus after the August 1990 Declaration of 
Sovereignty, Tatarstan declared both Russian and Tatar to be official languages of the 
republic and this became a key aspect of the 1992 Constitution and the 1992 Decree 
on Languages of the Peoples of the Tatar Republic (Garipov and Faller, 2003: 170-
171). Although in the early 1990s there was a lot of concern about this move in the 
Russian media and academic community, it was far short of the extensive demands 
and changes advocated by some members of the ToTs. 
 
Sovereignty: what’s in a name? 
 
In relation to the main topic of this article—namely, the discourse, historiography and 
political debate on ethnic mobilization in Tatarstan and Tatar nation building—a 
number of concepts are crucial, including ‘nation’, ‘citizenship’ ‘ethnicity’, ‘ethnic 
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revival’, ‘independence’, ‘sovereignty’, ‘secession’, etc. Shaimiev himself used 
numerous terms between 1989 and 1994. Gorenburg points out that between 1989 and 
1991, Shaimiev talked about “independence” (samostroyatel’nost’), then from 1991 
to 1993 of “economic sovereignty” and of a “Tatarstan nation” (Gorenburg, 1999: 
250). These shifting concepts do not demonstrate inconsistency or indecisiveness, but 
a desire to move the agenda forward without generating a local or federal Russian 
backlash. The context is also crucial: the December 1993 Constitution had been 
drawn up and approved, and Tatar bilateral treaty negotiations with Russia had begun, 
becoming a reality in February 1994.  
Shaimiev’s tendency to play down “sovereignty” and “secession” in favour of 
“autonomy” (albeit dressed up in the cloak of independence and sovereignty for his 
local audience), has meant that he has gradually been able to neutralize the radicals, 
ensure that Russians living in Tatarstan are not discriminated against; and so in due 
course, he secured a high percentage of Russian supporters for Tatar autonomy. 
Hence Gorenburg writes: 
This [strategy] allowed them [Shaimiev and his government] to maintain their 
support among non-titular ethnic groups, preserve peace in the republic [of 
Tatarstan and Russia] and avoid excessively alienating the central government 
(Gorenburg, 1999:251-252). 
 
Crucial to this cross ethnic support throughout Tatarstan was Shaimiev and his 
advisors promotion of “inclusion” rather than “exclusion” in various key documents. 
The following extracts from the 1990 Declaration on the State Sovereignty of the 
Republic of Tatarstan will serve to illustrate the point: 
realizing the historical responsibility for the fortunes of multinational peoples; 
expressing respect for the  sovereign rights of all peoples, inhabiting the 
Russian Federation and the USSR […], ensuring the inherent rights of Tatars, 
of the whole population of the Republic to self-determination […]. Irrespective 
of nationality, social origin, belief, political convictions and other differences, 
the Tatar SSR shall guarantee all citizens of the Republic equal rights and 
freedoms. Russian and Tatar shall be state languages and shall be equal in 
Tatar SSR and the maintenance and development of languages of other 
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nationalities shall be ensured” (M. Shaimiev, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet 
of Tatar Soviet Social Republic Kazan, 30 August 1990, emphasis added)7 
 
It is clear from the above that the 1990 sovereignty document, while 
promoting Tatars and trying to improve their status through language vitalization 
rather than ethnic revival per se, Shaimiev still promoted equality for all ethnic groups 
in the Tatar ASSR, treating Tatars and Russians as “equal”.  However from a Moscow 
and Russian-speaking perspective, the increased importance attached to Tatar and the 
use of the terms ‘sovereignty’ and ‘equal rights’ might have been seen as undermining 
Russian/Soviet hegemony, Soviet federalism and the dominance of the Russian 
language. For this reason, at this early stage in Tatar nation building, the main goal of 
ethnic mobilization in Tatarstan was language promotion rather than broader systemic 
change. However, Shaimiev was quick to point out in an August 1991 newspaper 
interview that “our position remains the same: the sovereignty of the Republic of 
Tatarstan will not have a national colouring”.8  
While Shimaev’s greatest critics—the ardent Tatar nationalists within the 
ToTs—may have felt that he had sold the Volga Tatars out, Shaimiev was fully aware 
of how delicate the situation in Russia was by late 1991. It had lost the 14 former 
union republics and a large proportion of its Soviet empire, so he limited his demands 
to the promotion of Tatar language and culture. 
By 6 November 1992, when the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan had 
been drawn up, although Article 1 stated that the “Republic of Tatarstan” was a 
“sovereign democratic state”, the emphasis was now on economic aspects of 
sovereignty. As Article 9 points out: 
The earth, mineral wealth, water, forest and other natural resources, the animal 
and vegetable kingdom, means of state budget, assets of national banks, 
cultural and historical values of the peoples of Tatarstan and other estate 
ensuring the economic independence of the republic, the preservation of 
material and spiritual culture, shall be the property of the whole people.9 
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Here it is evident that the 1992 Tatarstan Constitution was emphasizing the 
need to defend its economic resources and industries so that the economic benefits of 
sovereignty would be available to all citizens of Tatarstan. 
Coping with Russian presidential power shifts 
 
A significant factor in the post-Soviet era as Tatarstan was debating the key issue of 
the benefits of Federalism and decentralism in Russia was the difficulties facing 
Russia after the collapse of the USSR. Thus Lilia Shevtsova concludes: 
Post-communist Russia is a country of paradoxes. On the one hand, it is a 
model of endless movement. On the other, there is evidence all around of 
inertia and continuity […] there are areas of dynamism and success, areas of 
crisis and collapse, and increasingly areas of stagnation” (Shevtsova, 1999: 1). 
 
Since 1991 Russia has gone through a major economic, political and social 
transformation:  Economically Russia has dismantled its central planned economy and 
gradually introduced a market economy; politically Russia has moved from a one 
party to a multi-party system and also introduced a strong Presidency and socially 
Russia has moved from the old system of solidarity which guaranteed basic socio-
economic and labour rights to a radical overhaul of its system of social assistance. 
This has meant that the old welfare system has gradually been dismantled and a new 
system of social provision introduced. In this context, George W. Breslauer makes the 
following comparison of Soviet leaders’ aims: 
Khrushchev tried to reform the system; Brezhnev tried to consolidate 
and adapt it; Gorbachev attempted to transform it into a socialist 
democracy; and Yeltsin sought ultimately to destroy and replace it 
(Breslauer 2001: 45, author’s emphasis). 
 
The problem was that Yeltsin may have destroyed the communist system but 
he struggled to replace it with something stable, strong and durable throughout the 
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1990s, so there were constant conflicts: between the executive and parliament, 
between the centre and the regions, among the ‘oligarchs’ or financial clans; within 
the presidential entourage and between the main political parties—Liberal Democratic 
Party of Russia (LDPR)  through to the Communist Party of the Russian Federation 
(KPRF)—many of which opposed his rule. The problems Yeltsin inherited from the 
Soviet system were big enough for any new post-Soviet leader to tackle, but the 
situation was compounded by Yeltsin’s style of leadership which was erratic, 
unpredictable and impulsive. Yeltsin had a clear lack of ideology, apart from being 
broadly anti-communist and as a result, his philosophy was rather eclectic. As 
Shevtsova notes: 
Yeltsin could move in various directions and combine various ideologies—
Westernisation, liberal democracy, open authoritarianism, statism and elements 
of nationalism” (Shevtsova, 2001: 83). 
 
The consequence from 1991 to 1999 was political and economic instability 
because of Yeltsin’s failure to take control and be decisive (so Russia was often 
rudderless). There were constant shake-ups (e.g. several prime ministers in the 
1990s), and everyone failed to rally around “a single system of values”. There was 
fierce opposition by KPRF and LDPR to Yeltsin’s policies (notably on the economy 
and Chechnya). Moreover Yeltsin was in bad health, frequently ill and prone to 
drinking. The 1990s saw the rise of paternalism and favouritism under Yeltsin, as he 
often failed to weigh up the consequences of his decisions, which led to the need for 
constant adjustment and compromise; so he was in favour of “sharing responsibility 
without sharing power” (Williams, 1996: 9-36; Williams, 2000: 248-266).  
From Shaimiev and Tatarstan’s perspective, the aforementioned weaknesses 
and problems were clearly to their advantage. Thus Shaimiev proceeded to pursue his 
sovereignty project in a more sustained way. However, far from undermining the 
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notion of post-Soviet federalism, Tatarstan sought to create the symbolic and 
institutional trappings of sovereignty, which retained the integrity of the Russian state 
but gave Tatarstan greater autonomy within that post-Soviet space, so both sides 
gained. This Volga Tatar concept of sovereignty was perhaps most clearly outlined 
during the March 1992 referendum in Tatarstan which stated that: 
The goal of the referendum is to determine if the change of Tatarstan from an 
autonomous republic to a sovereign state which remains united with the 
Russian Federation in a common economic and geopolitical space, but, which 
based on commonly accepted principles of equality and self determination of 
peoples, seeks to build relations with Russia and other states in a new way, on 
the basis of bilateral agreements and the delegation of some authorities to the 
Russian Federation on this basis, answers to the will of the peoples of 
Tatarstan.10 
 
Once more a number of key themes are evident—unity, commonality with 
Russia, equality, self-determination. What Shaimiev desired from Moscow was 
respect and fair and equal treatment, and in return the President of Tatarstan was 
effectively promising that they would share the same post-Soviet space and that 
Tatarstan would not break away from the Russian Federation.  
With regard to the referendum of 22 March 1992, it is important to point out 
that 61.4% of the population supported sovereignty, and 43% of Russians and 48% of 
Tatars living in Tatarstan were totally in favour of independence (Gorenburg, 2003: 
135-136). The Tatarstan authorities emphasized greater autonomy from Moscow but 
not secession as the moderate Shaimiev wanted to maintain interethnic peace and 
economic stability for all those living in the republic. 
The March 1992 federal treaty granted special status to republics and 
recognized their sovereignty and rights to local property and resources. This was 
followed in 1994 by other concessions in the form of power-sharing treaties. Tatarstan 
was one of the beneficiaries. Shaimiev’s moderate approach, which successfully 
marginalized Russian centrists and Tatar nationalists alike, eventually led to the 
Williams, Tatar Nation-Building since 1991 
111 
 
signing of the “Treaty on the delineation of judicitional subjects and mutual 
delegation of authorities between the state bodies of power of the Russian Federation 
and the state bodies of power of the Republic of Tatarstan” in February 1994. The aim 
of this treaty was to decide who had power over which issues. Russia and Tatarstan 
had joint responsibility for the preservation of territorial integrity, common economic 
interests, cultures and languages, security and basic human rights on both sides, but 
Tatarstan was able to set its own budget, define and impose the republic taxes, 
manage its own economic affairs and engage in international relations with the 
outside world.11 These limited indicators of ‘sovereignty’ were granted, Bahry argues, 
providing Tatarstan stayed within the bounds of Russian Federal law and policy 
(Bahry, 2005: 136).   
While this looked like a major loss of central authority, this was far from 
being the case. Although Tatarstan negotiators used the term gosudarstvennost 
(‘stateness’) to refer to the outcome and gave the impression the republic had been 
granted economic sovereignty, in reality Moscow still had control over foreign trade, 
foreign capital and tax raising issues, so 85% of the taxes were determined by 
Moscow and only 15% by Tatarstan. On the upside though Tatarstan could now 
utilize its overseas oil revenues for the benefit of the leadership (so they could retain 
power), and for all citizens of Tatarstan so that everyone could see how the new so-
called ‘sovereignty’ worked (Bahry, 2005: 134-135).  
Shaimiev, as an ex-Soviet government minister, was well acquainted with his 
republic and wherever possible, according to his supporters, he resisted Moscow’s 
pressures to introduce price liberalization, privatization, etc. and was strongly 
opposed to the adverse affects of Yeltsin’s ‘shock therapy’ policy (Williams 1996: 9-
36). Shaimiev used local taxes to maintain support for state industry in Tatarstan and 
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subsidized food and utility prices. As a consequence Shaimiev managed, unlike his 
federal counterpart, to preserve social cohesion and the worst excesses of Russia’s 
economic problems (Bukharev, 1999: 31-35).  Bukharaev concludes that Tatarstan’s 
economic model under Shaimiev “was essentially characterised by its soft entry into 
the market and gradual privatization with simultaneous provision of the social safety 
net” (Bukharaev, 1999: 37). 
Through this strategy Shaimiev was seeking to achieve greater economic 
autonomy, to reduce Moscow’s interference in its economic affairs, and to protect 
Tatarstan against the adverse effect of the ups and (mostly) downs of Yeltsin’s 
economic policy. 
In terms of Yeltsin’s policies, his reforms led to inflation, budget deficits, 
major wage arrears, privatization, poor tax collection, the need for loans from the 
International Monetary Fund, a heavy reliance on imports, and the need to sell 
Russian and Tatar oil and gas to stay afloat. He did not use tried and tested policies, 
and had no solutions for the mounting problems. Instead he ruled Russia by ‘veto’ and 
‘instinct’, and his policies were largely ad hoc, reactive, aimed at preserving his 
personal rule.  
With regards to centre–periphery relations Yeltsin was seen as weak and 
indecisive, as giving away too much power to the likes of Tatarstan. Following the 
economic collapse of 1998, Yeltsin’s authoritarian tendencies, his major failures and 
his tendency to retreat, coupled with Russia’s instability, all prompted his resignation 
in December 1999. He nominated Vladimir Putin as his successor, but the Yeltsin 
legacy was not a good one and he left Putin with a great many issues to resolve (see 
Williams, 1996: 9-36; Williams, 2000: 248-266). 
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Putin and Tatarstan 
 
Putin’s rise took place in the context of increasing feelings of insecurity, fear and 
personal danger as a result of the legacy of an unsuccessful war in Chechnya, a 
Chechen attack on Dagestan and the Moscow apartment, and the Volgodonsk and 
Buinaksk explosions of September 1999. Putin successfully used Chechen threats to 
unite Russian society and consolidate his regime in the run-up to the March 2000 
presidential elections. Over the next eight years, and during two terms in office, he 
proved himself to be more dynamic, reliable and decisive than Yeltsin. Where 
Gorbachev destroyed the USSR and Yeltsin failed to serve and protect Russia’s 
national interests, Putin stressed both the pros and cons of the Soviet era and 
emphasized the need to put Russia first, to restore its national pride, and to protect 
Russia’s national interests. This eventually led to a more authoritarian type of rule— 
an anti-oligarch campaign, limitations on political pluralism and freedom of the press, 
a hardline stance on Chechnya, standing up to the West, managing the economy more 
effectively and adopting a nationalistic and ‘great power’ rhetoric to neutralize 
political opponents (LDPR, KPRF). Finally, Putin used the majority of the Unity or 
United Russia Party in the Dumas of 1999, 2004, 2007 to push through reforms which 
granted greater power to the Russian president and the security structures, 
prosecutors, and other allies.  
Returning to the main theme of this article, Putin has sought to refocus power 
to the centre, reducing that of regional and other elites. He has portrayed himself as 
“President of all Russians” and ran on a ticket that promoted stability and renewal. 
Thus Shevtsova concludes: 
The center [Kremlin] has managed to liquidate the independence of regional 
elites, to depoliticize big business, to drive the opposition out of legal politics, 
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and finally to rally around itself servile social groups that were willing to 
support every initiative the Kremlin took (Shevtsova, 2007: 47). 
 
Putin’s Russia from 2000-2008 was characterized by growing centralization 
and a changing regional policy. Orrtung maintains that: 
Over the course of his first term (2000-4), Putin transformed center-regional 
relations and restricted the regions’ political power. The changes […] greatly 
strengthened the central executive’s oversight and control of the regional 
administrations and limited the governors’ capacity to make policy without the 
Kremlin’s consent (Orrtung, 2008: 3). 
 
Putin did this through a variety of means: firstly, he created polpredy (‘super 
governors’) to oversee regional governors; secondly, governors and regional 
legislative chairman were stripped of the right to sit on the Federation Council; third, 
he abolished the election of governors and presidents of national republics; fourth, he 
divided Russia into seven districts (the same as military districts) run by his own 
appointees; and finally, he increased the economic control of the Russian Treasury 
over governors.12 The current presidential representative in the Volga federal district 
is Grigory Rapota.13  
What did all this mean for the February 1994 bilateral power-sharing treaty 
between Russia and Tatarstan when it came up for its ten-year renewal on 29 October 
2005? According to Graney, after September 2004, Tatarstan:  
[…] pursued the same strategy that had brought them such success in the past – 
keeping the sovereignty project as robust as possible while accommodating it 
to new political and economic realities in Russia (Graney, 2009: 139). 
 
Throughout 2004 and 2005, the Tatarstan authorities used their parliament, 
members of the Federation Council and United Russia Party structures to try and limit 
the impact of Putin’s regional reforms: 
[U]ltimately some elements of Tatarstan’s proposed amendments were 
accepted by Putin—the center agreed that regional parliaments and elites 
should be ‘consulted’ in the period proceeding nominations of candidates for 
regional executive, and a month long ‘conciliation’ period was introduced 
before the dissolution of any regional parliament in the event of 2 consecutive 
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candidate rejections (Rossisskaya Gazeta, 15 December 2004, cited in Graney, 
2009: 137-138). 
 
The negotiations around the renewal of the 1994 bilateral treaty began in 
October 2004 and were almost completed by 10 March 2005. According to Graney, 
Shaimiev supported Putin during the Beslan crisis and in the process secured Putin’s 
support for re-nomination as President of Tatarstan on 11 March 2005 (Graney, 2009: 
138).  Subsequently Putin participated in the 1,000th anniversary of Kazan 
celebrations in late August 2005. This is interpreted by Graney as a sign of a less 
hardline and more conciliatory approach to certain regions, providing they made 
concessions to Moscow (Graney, 2009: 140-145). All this paid off when in October 
2005, the new revised bilateral treaty between Moscow and Tatarstan was approved 
and subsequently ratified by the Russian Duma and Federal Council on 4 and 6 July 
2007 respectively (Graney, 2009: 147). This less aggressive and less separatist 
approach led to Shamiaev being re-elected four times (1996, 1999, 2001, 2005) and to 
his becoming an ally of Putin and a senior figure in United Russia.  
The successful renewal of the bilateral treaty also confirmed Tatarstan’s 
distinctiveness and ensured that it retained some economic and cultural autonomy in 
the early twenty-first century. Bahry rightly concludes that “the retraction of regional 
privileges was slower and more difficult in Tatarstan […] than in many other regions 
[of Russia]” (Bahry, 2005: 141). However, she also adds that “sovereignty proved to 
be more internal than external” (Bahry, 2005: 141, author’s emphasis). 
 
Future prospects 
 
Shaimiev was the top politician in Tatarstan for over 20 years and was not replaced 
until March 2010, when Rustam Minnikhanov took over the post. While Shaimiev 
made a concession to the current Russian President Medvedev, albeit unwillingly, to 
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step down as head of the republic, he has managed to stay in power; he subsequently 
became a United Russia candidate and then ‘State Advisor’ with wide-ranging powers 
such as initiating bills, and making recommendations to the second President of 
Tatarstan. It is possible that he is the power behind the throne, as the new President 
Minnikhanov formed a government based on the ex-president’s recommendations, 
and only presented them to the new prime minister afterwards. Furthermore, Ivanov 
suggests that around 50% of ministerial chairs have been retained by Shaimiev’s 
people; the other half by Minnikhanov’s supporters (Pavlov, 2010). Shaimiev’s new 
position gives him quasi-presidential powers. Although neither Medvedev nor Putin 
came to Rustam Minnikhanov’s inauguration, suggesting that something was amiss, at 
the time of writing the federal authorities had not interfered in Tatarstan’s affairs.  
This brings us to the final key issue: can Tatarstan’s sovereignty and long-term 
nation building project survive under the new President Minnikhanov? The answer 
depends on a number of factors, not least whether Medvedev will continue with 
Putin’s onslaught on Russia’s regions, the strength of Minnikhannov’s power base, 
his negotiating skills, and the degree of support that Volga Tatars and Russians have 
for Tatarstan autonomy in 2011 and beyond. Recent research by Hagendoorn et al. 
suggests that support for what they term “regional separatism” depends on age, 
gender, level of education, group relationships, ethnic migration, religion and so forth 
(Hagendoorn et al., 2008: 357).  Hagendoorn and his colleagues conclude that the 
factors indicating support for “regional separatism” include increasing wealth, 
maintenance of the republic, and the fact that people have become acquainted with 
greater autonomy. But all this must be balanced against countermeasures from the 
federal government (e.g. economic sanctions, military intervention, and so forth) 
(Hagendoorn et al., 2008: 359-360).  Apart from the use of the term “regional 
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separatism”, which does not seem to fit the Tatarstan model of sovereignty, it is clear 
that Russian and Volga Tatar support for these goals are high and that intergroup 
relations are generally good, with all enjoying the possibility of becoming prosperous. 
So in these terms the outlook seems positive.  
Giuliano’s research highlights another trend in Tatarstan’s favour, namely the 
fact that since the 1960s Tatarstan has undergone a process of zemlyachestvo (that is 
the creation of an ‘in-group’) and this network and patronage system was continued 
under Shaimiev. Its goal was to protect member’s positions and preserve the 
zemlyachestvo network (Giuliano, 2000: 307-308). If at least 50% of Minnikhanov’s 
government come from this system, and if he continues to support the network and 
patronage system, then it is probable that the Tatarstan sovereignty project will be 
maintained and expanded, whenever possible, for many years to come. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This article has demonstrated that Volga Tatar elites have sought to gain political 
power and economic wealth without provoking a backlash from Moscow or the local 
multiethnic population. This was achieved through a totally different integrationist 
strategy to that pursued in other parts of Russia, for example in Chechnya. Both 
republics implemented different sovereignty projects, levels of nationalism and 
varying degrees of accommodation within Russian federalism. However the impact 
has been positive for Volga Tatar regional identity and negative, thus far, for 
Chechens, resulting in the labelling of the latter as ‘terrorists’ in the post-Soviet, post-
9/11 world.  
These different outcomes are partly the result on the one hand of the key role 
played by Volga Tatar elites in promoting Tatar language revitalization and economic 
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autonomy, and on the other hand of the more extremist measures and demands for 
sovereignty and secession by various Chechen and North Caucasus groups. This has 
led to the pursuit of ethnic nationalism in Chechnya and elsewhere in the Caucasus, 
while the two presidents of Tatarstan have largely emphasized a more civic form of 
nationalism which involves promoting nationhood with citizenship and inclusive 
political participation. Both of these reform strategies have been pursued in line with 
their own respective post-Soviet interests. This had some positive effects in Tatarstan, 
namely reduced interethnic conflict, greater social cohesion, and increased political 
and economic equality, while such trends remain elusive in Chechnya and the 
Caucasus. Tatarstan elites have sought to maximize autonomy and Chechens to gain 
sovereignty. Both groups tried to keep the nation building and ethnic mobilization 
process agenda under their firm control and for their respective benefits. However, 
while for Tatarstan this has amounted to greater autonomy, in the form of power-
sharing, in Chechnya it has led to continued threats to its sovereignty by Russia and to 
Russian federalism by Chechens. Despite Putin’s rhetoric during his time as president, 
high levels of Chechen nationalism remain and concessions were not sufficient to 
prevent ethnic clashes, as is sadly illustrated by the January 2011 bombings in 
Domodedovo airport in Moscow. However, to date, the Tatarstan leadership has by 
and large achieved its goal, gaining significant privileges from Moscow; Moscow in 
turn has been able to accommodate Volga Tatar nationalism and avoid secession from 
the Russian Federation.  
Notes  
 
The article is based on the results of an INTAS-funded project No. 05-1000006-8374, 
“Linguistic and Ethnic Revival in Russia: From Policy to Cultural Diversity” which enabled 
the analysis and collection of material on Tatar language use and policy, surveys, and visits to 
Tatarstan between October 2006 and September 2008. The author, as project coordinator, 
would like to thank all project participants from the UK (University of Central Lancashire, 
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Preston), Finland (University of Eastern Finland, Joensuu) and Udmurt state University, 
Izhevsk, Russia; INTAS for funding this work; the staff of the European reading room 
Library of Congress, Washington DC for their help in locating some of the sources used here 
and anonymous referees for their comments on an earlier draft which have substantially 
improved the quality of the final version. All errors remain the author’s.  
 
1 On Catherine the Great’s reforms see Abdullin (1976). For a useful overview of Russian-
Tatar relations after that period, see Yemelianova (1999). 
2 This is analysed in Bowring (2010).  
3 In placing an emphasis on Shaimiev, it is of course not the author’s intention to downplay 
the importance of other key participants in this process, such as Valentin V. 
Mikhailov, who was a member of Tatarstan’s State Council from 1990 and a member 
of the Federal Assembly from 1994 to 1995. The aim is rather to shift the focus onto 
Shaimiev’s skills in putting these sovereignty goals into practice. For more 
information on Mikhailov’s interpretation of these events see Mikhailov (2004a; 
2004b; 2010). 
4 For a more detailed discussion of the origins of the Volga Tatars see Rorlich (1986: Part 
One). 
5 On these trends, see Williams (1999). 
6 On ToTs, see Kondrashov (2000: Chapter 6). 
7 1990 Declaration of state sovereignty. Available at 
<http://www.kcn.ru/tat_en/politics/dfa/sover/decl1.htm>. 
8 M. Shaimiev, Rossisskaya gazeta, 17 August 1991, author’s emphasis. Shaimiev’s advisor 
Rafael Khakimov was instrumental here and ensured that when bilingualism was 
promoted it did not displace Russian (Khakimov, 1993). On the language aspect of 
nation building and ethnic mobilization see Suleymanova (2010). Language is of 
course a political issue, and there has been a constant struggle between the Tatarstan 
and Moscow authorities over the desire to use Latin scripts and to keep Cyrillic 
mandatory, respectively. In 2004 the Russian Federation Constitutional Court 
objected to language reforms in Tatarstan on the grounds that it limited citizens’ 
native language use and choice regarding the language of communication (see 
comment on Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation of 16 
November 2004 No 16-P ‘On the Case on the Examination of the Constitutionality of 
the Provisions in Article 10(2) of the Law of the Republic of Tatarstan ‘On 
Languages of the Peoples of the Republic of Tatarstan’ in Rossisskaya gazeta 23 
November 2004). For more on this see Suleymanova (2010). 
9 Constitution of Tatarstan 1992. Available at 
<http://www.kcn.ru/tat_en/politics/dfa/sover/cons8.htm>. 
10 ‘Zayavlenie Presidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta Respublika Tatarstan’ (‘Statement of 
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan’), Prezidium 
Verkhovnogo Soveta Republiki Tatarstan (Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the 
Republic of Tatarstan), 1992 (Graney, 2009: 34). 
11 Treaty between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan ‘On Delimitation of 
Jurisdictional Subjects and Mutual Delegation of Authority between the State Bodies 
of the Russian Federation and the State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan’. 
Available at <http://www.kcn.ru/tat_en/politics/dfa/inform/treaty.htm>. 
12 On these developments see Petrov and Slider (2003), Matsuzato (2004), Bahry (2005), 
Orttung (2008), and Slider (2008). For a detailed analysis of the challenges facing 
regional government see Ross and Campbell (2009) and Ross (2009). On Tatarstan in 
particular see Mukhariamov and Mukhariamova (2004); Sharafutdinova and 
Magomedov (2004).   
13 Like Putin, Grigory Rapota is a KGB/FSB career officer. He worked for the KGB at the 
First Chief Directorate and in the USA (1971-1975), Sweden (1979-1983, although 
he was expelled from Sweden on December 20, the Cheka Day), and Finland (1987-
1990). In 1992, Rapota was made head of the Third Geographical Department, and 
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between 1993 and 1998, he was head of the First Chief Directorate. I am grateful to 
anonymous reviewers for pointing this out. 
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